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People with mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) report experiencing tactile sensations on their 
own body when seeing another person being touched.  Although this has been associated 
with heightened empathy and emotion perception, this finding has recently been disputed. 
Here, we conduct two experiments to explore this relationship further. In Study 1, we 
develop a new screening measure for MTS.  We show that MTS is related to vicarious 
experiences more generally (including to itch and pain), but is not a simple exaggerated 
version of normality.  For example, people with MTS report videos of scratching as ‘touch’ 
rather than ‘itchiness’ and have localized sensations when watching others in pain.  In Study 
2, we show that MTS is related to increased emotional empathy to others and better ability to 
read facial expressions of emotion, but other measures of empathy are normal-to-low.  In 
terms of theoretical models, we propose that this is more consistent with a qualitative 
difference in the ability to selectively inhibit the other and attending to the self, which leads to 
heightened activity in shared self-other representations (including a mirror system for touch, 
but also includes other kinds of vicarious experience).   
 
Keywords: mirror-touch; synaesthesia/synesthesia; empathy; simulation; facial expression. 
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Introduction 
Our capacity to share the experiences of others may be a critical part of social 
behaviour. One process thought to be important for this is the ability to co-represent the 
experiences of other people by matching the observed state onto representations of our own 
first-hand experience – a process commonly referred to as simulation or mirroring (e.g. 
Gallese & Goldman, 1998). For example, observing touch in other people activates some of 
the same network of brain regions as the first-hand experience of touch (e.g. Keysers, Kaas, 
& Gazzola, 2010).  This is typically thought of as an implicit form of simulation in that people 
do not report any experience of touch.  People with mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS), 
however, do report feeling tactile sensations on their own body when seeing another person 
being touched.  Taken at face value, mirror-touch synaesthesia can be regarded as a form of 
empathic response – i.e. a shared state between self and other.  However, at a mechanistic 
level it is far less clear how MTS should be interpreted.  Is it an extreme form of normal 
empathy, or a qualitatively different form of empathy?  Are people who have a reportable 
shared state (like in MTS) better at empathising (or social cognition more generally) relative 
to people who have an implicit simulation of another’s state or, indeed, no simulation at all?  
Some have argued that shared (simulated) experiences, whether reportable or implicit, are 
unnecessary for understanding others because we can get all the relevant information from 
the visual system alone (Hickok, 2014).   In the study below, we seek to address these 
issues.  We determine whether people with MTS really do have enhanced socio-cognitive 
abilities, a claim that has recently been disputed (Baron-Cohen, Robson, Lai, & Allison, 
2016), and we determine whether MTS should be considered as an extreme end-point of 
normality. 
 In the first group study of MTS, Banissy and Ward (2007) developed a visuo-tactile 
interference task and, additionally, gave participants a questionnaire measure of empathy.   
The task involved detecting the location of touch to the participant’s own face or hands (left, 
right, both or none) whilst observing another person being touched (which they were 
instructed to try to ignore).  For congruent trials, the synaesthetic touch (induced by 
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observing touch) and physical touch were in the same location and for incongruent trials they 
mismatched.  People with MTS showed greater interference on incongruent trials relative to 
controls and were more likely to report synaesthetic touch as veridical (e.g. synaesthetic 
touch on left cheek and physical touch on right cheek being reported as “both”). Scores on 
the Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) also showed 
that people with MTS scored higher on questions related to Emotional Reactivity (e.g. 
intuitively picking up on someone’s feelings), but not to questions relating to Cognitive 
Empathy (e.g. predicting others’ thoughts) or Social Skills (e.g. interacting appropriately).  
The conclusion drawn was that MTS taps some aspects of empathy (shared emotions and 
feelings) more than others (e.g. reasoning about mental states). In a subsequent study, 
Banissy et al. (2011) showed that people with MTS have enhanced abilities at recognising 
subtle facial expressions, but do not show enhanced recognition of facial identity. This was 
interpreted as consistent with claims that the somatosensory system can aid social 
perception, via simulation, but that this mechanism is not relevant for identity recognition (e.g. 
Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000).    
These two studies (Banissy & Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2011) supported claims 
that MTS is relevant for understanding the mechanisms of empathy, but how, exactly, does it 
relate to this process?  This question remains to be fully answered.  In order to tackle this 
question, we need a proper understanding of what kind of information is selectively affected 
by MTS.  For example, if one were to witness an accident such as falling off a bike then 
there is a range of information that could be simulated: the emotional expression, how the 
body makes contact with the ground (touch), sensory and affective aspects of pain, and 
motor movements.  With regards to pain specifically, de Vignemont and Jacob (2012) have 
made a distinction between simulating the sensory features of pain (which they assume 
involves somatosensory representations) versus the affective features of pain.  It is presently 
unclear which of these, beyond touch, are implicated in MTS and how this differs from 
simulation processes in those without MTS.  It may involve body-specific (somatosensory) 
representations; shared affective or feeling states; or, indeed, neither (e.g. relying on vision 
5	
	
alone).  In discussing this, Ward and Banissy (2015) suggested that MTS specifically 
involves shared self-other body representations, but other (more ubiquitous) forms of 
vicarious experience, such as contagious itching or yawning, may be driven by shared 
feeling states. There is evidence that people with MTS have difficulty in differentiating their 
own body from that of others, even in tasks with little or no tactile component, such as 
control of imitation (Santiesteban, Bird, Tew, Cioffi, & Banissy, 2015) and agency attribution 
(Cioffi, Banissy, & Moore, 2016).  In the study below, we examined whether people with MTS 
report similar kinds of vicarious experiences to touch, pain and itch stimuli as people who 
lack MTS (albeit to a presumably greater extent).  We show that people with MTS tend to 
have a vicarious experience of the sensory component (including the location on the body) 
whereas others share the feeling state (e.g. feeling itchy after watching someone scratching). 
Contemporary models of empathy assume that it reflects a combination of different 
cognitive mechanisms.  These include shared representations for emotions (e.g. disgust; 
Wicker et al., 2003), actions (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), and somatosensation (including 
touch; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010) that are active both when a person is in that state 
and when observing (or thinking about) another person in that state.  Additional mechanisms 
are postulated to exist for emotion regulation and for perspective taking.  These mechanisms 
are important for flexibly regulating shared representations to either focus on ones own 
feelings (and discard the influence of others) or, conversely, to selectively attend to the other 
(e.g., Bird & Viding, 2014; Decety, 2011).  Ward and Banissy (2015) considered two ways of 
adapting this normative model of empathy to account for mirror-touch (although there may 
be more).  One possibility, termed Threshold Theory, is that people with MTS represent an 
extreme end-point of normal variation in activity in a mirror system for somatosensation.  For 
most people, observing touch does not elicit reportable experiences of touch despite 
neurophysiological evidence of activity within the somatosensory system (e.g. Blakemore et 
al., 2005).  For people with MTS, the same mechanism may be hyper-activated such that it 
crosses a threshold for awareness (Ward & Banissy, 2015).  A somewhat different account, 
termed Self-Other Theory, argues that people with MTS have difficulties in a mechanism 
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relevant to distinguishing self from other, such as attributing body ownership (Ward & 
Banissy, 2015).  In this account the tactile sensations still arise via the mirror system for 
touch, but the core explanatory difference lies outside of this system.  Although both theories 
explain MTS in relation to normative models, Threshold Theory regards it as an 
exaggeration of a normal mechanism whereas Self-Other Theory postulates a categorical 
difference in how the mechanism operates.  In both cases, MTS is assumed to reflect a 
(developmental) change in one or more mechanisms relevant to social cognition and hence 
can be used as a tool to explore the nature of these mechanisms within a traditional 
neuropsychological framework.  
 There is also a recent suggestion that MTS is not associated with heightened 
empathy at all (Baron-Cohen et al., 2016). Baron-Cohen et al. (2016) found that MTS was 
not associated with increased self-reported empathy, again using the EQ, and was not 
associated with better performance on facial expression recognition.  In addition to these null 
results, they found that: people with MTS reported tactile sensations when viewing touch to 
objects as well as humans; they reported worse social skills (a sub-component of the EQ); 
and they reported higher levels of autistic traits on another questionnaire measure (the 
Autism Spectrum Quotient), with autism regarded by some as the antithesis of enhanced 
empathy (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2009).   Although this study can be considered to be a failure to 
replicate previous findings, it is important to note that there are key methodological 
differences that make direct comparisons difficult – specifically concerning the criteria for 
determining who has MTS and who does not.  Although the visuo-tactile interference task of 
Banissy and Ward (2007) has been shown to offer a good way of identifying people with 
MTS, it requires bespoke equipment which is not readily accessible and requires different 
labs to establish their own baseline measures (tailored to their own equipment).  An 
alternative approach that we (Holle, Banissy, Wright, Bowling, & Ward, 2011) and others (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2016; Medina & De Pasquale, 2017) have used is to present 
participants with movies depicting touch and note the frequency and/or intensity of any felt 
tactile sensations.  But how many tactile sensations need to be reported to meet the criteria 
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for having MTS – one stimulus, all stimuli, or somewhere in between?  For example, Holle et 
al. (2011) reported that 66% of stimuli depicting touch to a human elicited a synaesthetic 
response in their MTS sample, but the inter-individual variation was very large (range = 14% 
to 100%).  In their recent study, Baron-Cohen et al. (2016) reported a different measure 
(average intensity), and the range of scores is unknown.  Others have used responses to 
single questions to indicate the presence of MTS (Chun & Hupe, 2013).  As such, there is a 
clear need to develop more standard measurement tools to determine the presence of MTS.   
 The research presented below develops a new tool for measuring MTS (Study 1).  
We examine how it relates to other kinds of vicarious experience (Study 1) and the socio-
cognitive differences of people who score highly on this measure (Study 2).  Study 1 uses a 
similar approach to that of Holle et al. (2011), Baron-Cohen et al. (2016) and others in that 
we present videos depicting touch, and related experiences (pain, itch) and determine the 
self-reported synaesthetic characteristics.  We aim to determine whether there are clear 
categorical differences between people at high and low ends of the measure or whether 
MTS occurs on a continuum.  If it is categorical, then we can determine where the distinction 
between MTS and non-MTS lies.  A categorical difference implies that there are distinct 
differences in kind between individuals (e.g. type A v. type B).  It implies that people fall into 
only one or other kind, and not some intermediate state (a step function).  The pattern of 
observations that one would expect to obtain depends both on the underlying distribution 
that one is trying to observe (hypothetically binary) plus noise and measurement error 
related to the task or questionnaire itself (which will almost certainly be continuous, e.g. 
Gaussian, and non-binary in nature).   One would only expect to observe a sharp transition 
between individuals if the distribution were a step function and the ability to measure the 
distribution was very precise.  In more realistic scenarios (with normal measurement error), 
we would expect to see differences between people at the extreme ends (people who are 
easy to categorise) and more overlap and continuity in the middle region (who are harder to 
categorise).  Importantly, the profile of people at either end should have different 
characteristics (A v. B) and not just be the same characteristic observed to a greater extent 
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(e.g. A and 2A).  The second study extends this further to examine the social and cognitive 
differences linked to MTS, based on the screening measure developed in the first study.  We 
use both questionnaire measures (e.g. of empathy) and objective measures (e.g. facial 
expression recognition) to attempt to resolve recent discrepancies, and to better inform 
theoretical models of empathy. 
 
Study 1: Characteristics of MTS and Development of a Screening Measure 
 
Method 
Participants 
 There were two groups of participants recruited for somewhat different purposes.  
One group was an undergraduate sample (N=283; 237 females, 46 males; mean age = 21.3 
years, S.D.=4.5, range=18-52) who took the screening measure for course credits and were 
essentially naïve as to the purpose of the study.  This enabled us to check the new 
screening measure against previous, objectively verified, estimates of prevalence (Banissy, 
Kadosh, Maus, Walsh, & Ward, 2009).  The second sample was more heterogeneous and 
consisted of people in an opportunity sample together with a self-referred group who had 
contacted us via email or via our website over several years (N=120; 104 females, 16 males; 
mean age = 32.2 years, S.D.=13.6, range=19-74).  This included people who had either 
given a description of MTS-like experiences (some reported pain rather than touch) or had 
given an affirmative response on a more general synaesthesia questionnaire to experiencing 
touch when viewing a video clip of touch to the right cheek (for a preliminary analysis of this 
sample see Ward & Banissy, 2015).  The study was ethically approved by the Cross-Schools 
Science and Technology Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex. 
 
Materials 
 The materials consisted of 30 short video clips depicting touch, itch and pain.  There 
were fourteen videos depicting touch to a human (from Holle et al., 2011).  These comprised 
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of 7 pairs of stimuli depicting touch to either the left or right, namely: 1) touch to the cheek 
with a finger; 2) touch to the cheek with the tip of a knife; 3) touch to the hands in egocentric 
perspective with a finger; 4) touch to the hands in egocentric perspective with a knife; 5) 
touch to the hands in allocentric perspective with a finger; 6) touch to crossed hands in 
egocentric perspective with a finger; 7) touch to the cheek with a finger with face inverted.  In 
all cases, the model was a Caucasian female and hands were palm down.  There were six 
videos of touch to inanimate objects namely a dummy head, dummy hands (egocentric 
perspective), and a fan – both from the left and right side (from Holle et al., 2011).  There 
were four videos, 20s long, depicting someone scratching intensely their chest or upper arm 
(from Holle, Warne, Seth, Critchley, & Ward, 2012).  There were six videos depicting pain 
that showed injections to the upper arm, hand, back and neck (from Grice-Jackson, Critchley, 
Banissy, & Ward, 2017).   
 
Procedure 
 The questionnaire was hosted on an online survey platform (Bristol Online Surveys).  
The 30 videos were presented in a fixed random order.  After each video was played 
participants were asked: “Do you experience anything on YOUR body? (excluding feelings of 
unease, disgust, or flinching)  [Yes/No]”.  Upon an affirmative answer they were asked three 
follow-up questions.  Firstly, they were asked “How would you describe the sensation?” and 
they were forced to choose one from the following checkbox options: Touch (without pain); 
Pain (without touch); Painful touch; Tingling; Itchiness; Feeling of being scratched; and Other 
[Please specify__].  This question was designed to assess phenomenology but without 
guiding participants towards one particular ‘desired’ answer (an approach that has not been 
applied to MTS before).   Itchiness and tingling are typically regarded as interoceptive states, 
whereas touch (and the feeling of being scratched) are clearly exteroceptive (i.e. implying 
physical contact with the body).  Pain can be both which is why it appeared in multiple 
response options.  Secondly, they were asked “Where on YOUR body was it felt?” and they 
were forced to choose from one of the following options: Not localisable; Left face; Right face; 
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Left hand; Right hand; Left arm; Right arm; Chest; Back; other [Please specify___] .  Finally, 
they were asked: “How intense was it? (0=nothing, 10 = very intense)”. 
 
Results 
 For the undergraduate naïve sample the overall mean number of responses (/14) 
when observing touch to a human was 0.75 (S.D.=1.84; range =0-11).  Of these the relative 
frequencies of the reported sensations were as follows (in descending order): 41.4% touch 
(without pain); 33.9% tingling; 7.1% other; 5.6% itchiness; 4.9% pain (without touch); 3.7% 
painful touch; and 3.4% the feeling of being scratched.  For identifying MTS we are only 
interested in tactile sensations and, for this purpose, the categories of touch (without pain), 
painful touch, and the feeling of being scratched were combined along with ‘other’ responses 
that described touch (e.g. “pressure” being the most common term).  Thus, participants can 
be ordered on a 0-14 scale with regards to MTS tendencies and the distribution of scores is 
show in Figure 1.  Although the distribution of scores is continuous, we show later, using 
independent measures, that there are qualitative differences between people who fall at high 
versus low ends of the scale.  In general, the measure is quite conservative insofar as it 
does not generate high numbers of people claiming to have MTS.  A score of 7/14 or above 
gives a prevalence that is close (2.1%) to the objectively verified prevalence of 1.6% 
reported by Banissy et al. (2009) and much lower than the ~10% of people who agreed to 
having MTS when answering a single question on a Likert scale in that same study.   The 
second group, recruited because they had possible MTS, had higher scores when observing 
touch to a human (mean = 3.99, S.D.=4.78, range =0-14).  For subsequent analyses, we 
collapse the two samples together to ensure that we have a sufficient number of participants 
at each level (particularly the rarer high level).  In the combined sample (self-referred and 
opportunistic), males (mean score =1.45, S.D. =3.07) and females (mean score=1.75, 
S.D.=3.40) performed equivalently (t(401)=.664, p=.974) and there were 5 males (8.0%) with 
scores >=7 and 34 females (10.0%).  As with other forms of synaesthesia, there was little 
evidence of a strong gender bias (e.g. Simner & Carmichael, 2015). 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Mean intensity scores were calculated for all trials and for all kinds of reported 
experiences.  The MTS score (0-14) was significantly correlated with the mean intensity of 
vicarious experiences for painful stimuli (r=.419, p<.001), itch (r=.444, p<.001), touch to 
dummy body parts (r=.576, p<.001) and touch to an object (r=.346, p<.001) as well as 
intensity scores for touch to a human (r=.782, p<.001) – see Figure 2.  That is, different 
kinds of vicarious experience tend to go together (at least in broad terms).  However, there 
are important differences too as described below. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Considering the difference between touch to a human versus inanimate objects 
(dummy body parts, a fan), Figure 2 shows that participants with an MTS score of around 5 
and above strongly differentiate amongst these stimuli (human > inanimate) but people with 
lower scores do not.  A 3x12 ANOVA contrasting mean intensity of touched stimuli (3 levels 
= human, dummy, object) against MTS score (12 levels as not all possible MTS scores were 
observed) revealed main effects of stimulus type (F(2,782)=183.56, p<.001, ηp2 =.319) and 
MTS score (F(11,391)=32.58, p<.001, ηp2 =.478) and, importantly, an interaction between 
them (F(22,782)=15.163, p<.001, ηp2 =.299).  The interaction reflects the fact those with 
higher MTS scores have a greater human-inanimate differentiation. The same pattern, 
namely human > inanimate at higher MTS scores, is found when one considers only those 
trials in which participants reported some kind of experience (i.e. non-zero intensities) – see 
Supplementary Material.			
The fact that many people at the high end report tactile experiences for objects, albeit 
weaker than for humans, appears to suggest a kind of ‘empathy for objects’ that runs 
counter to some of the initial claims made about MTS (e.g. Banissy & Ward, 2007).  
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However, this may not necessarily be true.  To explore this in more detail, we considered the 
videos depicting touch to a fan and asked which body part the tactile experience is felt on 
(see Figure 3).  If the hand (or fingertip) is reported then this is consistent with tactile 
simulation of a human agent (performing the touching) as opposed to the contrary 
explanation of putting themselves in the position of the object.  Indeed, there are differences 
between people at the high and low ends of the scale – those at the low end tend to report 
experiences on the face (as if they are the object) whereas those at the high end tend to 
report experiences on the hand/finger (as if they are delivering touch).  Splitting the group at 
our conventional division of <7 and >=7 produces a marginal effect (χ2(1)=3.78, p=.052), 
although the effect is apparent for a post-hoc division between low (0-3) and high groups (4-
14) (χ2(1)=15.38, p<.001).  For touch to a dummy, all participants showed a tendency to 
report touch to the touched body part (albeit to a less extent than a real body).     
With regards to stimuli depicting itchiness, the MTS score not only affects the 
intensity/frequency but also strongly affects the quality of the sensation (see also Figure 3).  
For people with low MTS scores the dominant experiences are “itchiness” and “tingling”, but 
for people with high scores then tactile experiences dominate (e.g. “feeling of being 
scratched”) – i.e. a double dissociation between low and high ends of the scale.  Dividing the 
participants at MTS<7 and MTS=>7 yields a significant difference in sensation quality (χ2 
(1)=83.67, p<.001).   
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The quantity and quality of the response to pain stimuli is summarised in Figure 4.  
Whilst people with high MTS scores report quantitatively more experiences than those with 
lower scores there is, crucially, a shift in the qualitative nature of the experiences reported.  
Those with lower scores tend to choose ‘pain (without touch)’ or ‘tingling’ whereas those with 
higher scores tend to choose ‘painful touch’ or ‘touch (without pain)’.  Dividing the 
participants at MTS<7 and MTS=>7 yields a significant difference in sensation quality 
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considering the five descriptors shown in the figure (χ2 (4)=60.14, p<.001).  Again people 
with probable MTS have a qualitatively different profile to those ‘neurotypical’ people without 
MTS.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 It has previously been noted that the majority of people with MTS adopt a mirrored 
(or specular) spatial reference frame when viewing touch to others: for instance, when 
seeing someone touched on their left cheek they report a feeling on their own right cheek (as 
if looking in a mirror).  A minority of people consistently report an anatomical spatial 
reference frame (seeing someone touched on the left cheek, is felt on their own left cheek).  
There were 9 videos in which human faces, hands, or bodies were observed from an 
allocentric perspective (6 involving touch, 3 involving itch) and the laterality of the response 
to each video was coded as anatomical or specular.  From this, each participant was 
classified as either having a specular mapping, anatomical mapping, or an inconsistent 
mapping.  The latter occurred if they produced an approximately equal number of anatomical 
and specular responses (differing by <2).  The results are summarised in Figure 5.  
Participants with MTS score >=7 tended to have consistent spatial reference frames, and the 
division between specular (84%) and anatomical (16%) in this group is similar to that 
reported by Banissy et al. (2009).  Chance levels for being consistent were calculated using 
binomial probabilities assuming a 50/50 random binary choice between a sensation on the 
left or right, and the number of trials in which touch was reported.  For MTS>=7 the 
probability of being consistent by chance was 71.1% compared to our observed value of 
92.3%.  For MTS<7 the probability of being inconsistent by chance was 48.7% compared to 
our observed value of 64.5%.  These indicative baselines, together with other evidence of 
non-randomness (predominance of specular), suggest that synaesthetic touch is generated 
by systematic spatial correspondences between self and other body representations. 
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INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 In summary, we present a novel and simple measure of MTS that is relatively 
conservative (i.e. does not lead to large numbers of people claiming to have it).  Although 
the measurement scale is continuous (a score from 0 to 14), we show that people at the top 
end of the scale behave differently from people on the bottom end of the scale in terms of 
the quality of other kinds of vicarious experience.  For instance, they show greater 
differentiation between humans and inanimate stimuli, they tend to report different kinds of 
sensations when watching itch and pain, and they report more consistency in the spatial 
reference frame that is adopted.  This suggests that MTS reflects a categorical difference. 
 
Study 2: Performance on Cognitive Tests and Empathy Measures 
 
Method 
Participants 
 All participants had previously completed Study 1.  We invited participants that 
represented all parts of the MTS scale back to perform further tests, with a natural limitation 
being that participants at the higher end of the scale are rarer and harder to recruit for in-
person testing.  A total of 103 participants (average age=28.2, S.D.=11.34; 83 females, 19 
males, 1 undisclosed) took part in some or all of the studies.  The distribution of participants 
by MTS score was as follows: MTS score of 0 (N=46; mean age =24.8, S.D.=7.6; 35 
females), score of 1-3 (N=22; mean age =25.9, S.D.=8.7; 18 females), 4-6 (N=10; mean age 
=33.9, S.D.=17.6; 8 females), 7-10 (N=15; mean age=33.0, S.D.=13.3; 13 females), and 11-
14 (N=10; mean age=35.5, S.D.=14.4; 9 females).  As one of the tasks (the visuo-tactile 
interference test) required in-person testing, this was run on 36 participants.  For certain 
analysis, sub-groups were formed by binning participants according to their MTS score.    
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The study was ethically approved by the Cross-Schools Science and Technology 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex.  Participants were offered either £8 
for their time or 1 hour of course credits for research participation. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were invited to take part in 4 tests, 3 of which were hosted online and 1 
of which required testing in person.  The tests took around 1 hour to complete in total.  The 
tests are described in detail below. 
Cambridge Face Perception Test.   This test involves sorting a sequence of morphed 
faces into order and was administered online via Testable (www.testable.org).  Three 
different versions were used: one relating to facial identity (adapted from Duchaine, Germine, 
& Nakayama, 2007); one relating to facial expressions of anger (Janik et al., 2015); and one 
relating to facial expressions of happiness (Janik-McErlean et al., 2016).  The versions were 
presented in a random order.  The facial identity test presents a black and white target face 
in a three-quarter profile view.  Beneath it are six morphs of that face (12%-72% in steps of 
12%) presented from a frontal view and in a randomly ordered series.  The participants’ task 
was to drag the morphs so that they form an ordered series between the anchor points 
labelled “least like the person” and “most like the person”.  They were given up to 1 minute 
per trial.  There were 8 of these trials in total for the facial identity test (note that the original 
task developed by Duchaine et al., 2007 involves 8 upright and 8 inverted face trials, but 
here we only use 8 upright trials).  The anger and happiness tests worked in a similar way.  
In both tests, the participants are presented with six morphed faces (between the target 
expression and neutral) in a row which have to be sorted from “most happy” to “least happy” 
or from “most angry” to “least angry” (depending on the test). There was no target face.  The 
morphs ranged from 40%-0% in steps of 8% for anger and 15-0% in steps of 3% for 
happiness (lower morph levels are used for happiness to ensure comparability in task 
difficulty; Janik-McErlean et al., 2016).  There were 10 happy trials and 10 anger trials with 
each trial taking up to 1 minute.
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Scores for all versions of the test are computed by determining the deviations from 
the correct position for each face per trial and summing these deviations. For example, if a 
face is placed two positions from its correct position, the participant would have an error 
score of 2 for this item.   For ease of exposition the error scores are converted into 
percentage correct, relative to the maximum error score that could have been obtained. 
Empathy Questionnaires (EQ and IRI). Both empathy questionnaires were 
administered via Qualtrics, an online software for collecting questionnaire data.  A short 15-
item version of the EQ was used (Muncer & Ling, 2006), resulting in 5 items for each of the 
three subscales: Social Skills (SS), Cognitive Empathy (CE) and Emotional Reactivity (ER). 
Examples of items are “I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively” for the 
Cognitive Empathy factor, “I find it hard to know what to do in a social situation” for the 
Social Skills factor and “I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems” for the 
Emotional Reactivity factor. Participants indicate how much they agree with this statement 
on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. If the 
participant indicates a strong endorsement of empathic behaviour then 2 is scored for this 
item. A score of 1 is obtained by indicating mild endorsement. Thus, the highest score per 
subscale is 10, resulting in a total score of 30.  
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index, or IRI (Davis, 1983), is a multidimensional scale 
that assesses various components of empathy. There are 28 items which are divided among 
the four subscales. The subscales are Perspective Taking (PT), Fantasy Scale (FS), 
Empathic Concern (EC) and Personal Distress (PD) and each subscale consists of seven 
items. Examples for the items are “I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about 
things that might happen to me” for the Fantasy Scale factor,  “I often have tender, 
concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” for the Empathic Concern factor, “I 
sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view” as an example 
for the Perspective Taking factor and “In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-
ease” for the Personal Distress factor. Responses are given on a five point scale (scored 0 
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to 4) ranging from “Does not describe me very well” to “Describes me very well”. The 
maximum score per subscale is 28.  
The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ).  The VPQ consists of 16 video clips 
depicting mild-moderate pain, either injections or sporting injuries (Grice-Jackson et al., 
2017).  Each clip was around 10 seconds long and had no audio (they are available at 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCT8goTgWGRsu14NjVaPCSGw/videos).    After each 
clip, participants were initially asked whether they experienced a sensation of pain in their 
own body when viewing the video (yes/no). If participants answered ‘yes’ they were asked 
three further questions:  (1) how intense their pain experience was (1= very mild, 10= 
intense pain; 0 was used to code people who reported no pain at all); (2) to indicate the 
location of their experience (either ‘localised to the same point as the observed pain’, 
‘localised but not to the same point, and ‘a general/ non-localisable pain experience’); and (3) 
to select pain descriptors  that best describe their experience (from a set of 23 with multiple 
selections possible).  The latter were obtained from a standard set used in the pain 
assessment literature (Melzack, 1975) and comprised 10 descriptors with sensory qualities 
(e.g. “sharp”) and 10 descriptors with affective qualities (e.g. “nauseating”).  A cluster 
analysis was used to group participants based on their responses to a number of input 
variables from the VPQ.  The input variables used were mean intensity of pain experiences, 
the number of localised responses minus the number of generalized responses, and the 
number of sensory descriptors minus the number of affective descriptors.  A two-step cluster 
analysis was performed (Zhang, Ramakrishnan, & Livny, 1996) which initially involved a 
hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s (1963) method followed by a non-hierarchical k-
means analysis with 50 iterations. The cluster centroids and number of clusters for the k-
means analysis were guided by the hierarchical analysis.  The analysis was performed on a 
large dataset (N=1000+) of people who had taken this measure, which included participants 
from the present study. 
Visuo-Tactile Interference Test.  This task is a version of that originally used by 
Banissy and Ward (2007) and uses visual stimuli depicting a hand approaching and touching 
18	
	
a human face (one male and one female face presented equally often).  The tactile stimuli 
are delivered by solenoid tappers (Heijo electronics) attached to the participants cheek using 
surgical tape.  There are 3 kinds of visual stimuli (left, right, both) and 4 kinds of tactile 
stimuli (left, right, both, none) that are combined to generate trials that are spatially 
congruent (54 trials), spatially incongruent (108 trials), or for which touch is only seen but not 
felt (54 no-touch trials).  Spatial congruency was determined with respect to a specular 
reference frame for all participants except for one person (with MTS score=4) who reported 
a consistent anatomical spatial reference frame.  The participants’ task was to report the 
location of physical touch and ignore the observed touch (and the synaesthetic touch that it 
generates).  Poorer performance on incongruent and no-touch trials is taken to indicate that 
synaesthetic touch is subjectively confusable with real touch.   All trials were presented in a 
random order over 3 blocks, after a practice block of 8 trials.  The trial began with a fixation 
cross (1500 msec) which was followed by three images in succession (100 msec) with the 
final image remaining on the screen until a response was made.  The tapper was 
synchronized to the onset of the final image which depicted touch.  Responses were made 
using a keypress (c=left, b=both, m=right, space=no-touch).  In order to mask the faint sound 
made by the tapper, participants wore headphones and each trial was accompanied by 
Brownian noise commencing at 1500 msec.   
 
Results 
 Based on previous findings, we hypothesized that there would be a positive 
association between MTS and facial expression recognition (Banissy et al., 2011), a positive 
association between Emotional Reactivity on the EQ (Banissy & Ward, 2007), a negative 
association between MTS and Social Skills on the EQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2016), and a 
positive association between incongruent and no-touch trials (RT and/or errors) and MTS 
score on the visuo-tactile interference test (Banissy & Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009).  As 
these were predicted associations we did not correct for multiple comparisons, but for other 
measures where we had no a priori prediction we use corrected p-values.  As we did not 
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know a priori a cut-off score for MTS we also conducted exploratory analyses at different 
cut-offs that, in line with recommended practice (McBee & Field, 2017), rely on the reporting 
of effect sizes alone.   
For the Cambridge Face Perception tests, there was a significant Pearson’s 
correlation between MTS score (0-14) and ability on the expression recognition test (r=.265, 
p=.019) but not on the identity matching test (r=.017, p=.884).  That is, those people with 
more extreme mirror-touch synaesthesia are better at recognizing subtle facial expressions.  
This is shown in Figure 6, dividing the participants into bins (although the correlations were 
performed on individual participants).  The figure also shows the effect size for different cut-
off scores with the largest effects (Cohen’s d=0.72) emerging around MTS>=9 (contrasted 
with MTS<9).  Note that Banissy et al. (2010) found effect sizes of Cohen’s d = 1.52 and 
Cohen’s d = 0.40 for expression recognition in their studies. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 7 shows the results for the empathy questionnaires.  For the Empathy 
Quotient, there was a significant positive Pearson’s correlation between MTS score and the 
Emotional Reactivity subscale (r=.261, p=.018) but not for Cognitive Empathy (r=-.055, 
p=.622) or Social Skills subscales (r=-.152, p=.172).  The latter showed a trend for a 
negative correlation, similarly to that noted by Baron-Cohen et al. (2016).   As before, these 
results are calculated at the individual level but displayed here for different bins.  The effect 
size was calculated for different diagnostic cut-offs.  Banissy and Ward (2007) reported a 
Cohen’s d of 0.77 for Emotional Reactivity, and we are able to replicate this finding (Cohen’s 
d = 0.73) albeit only at the higher cut-offs (MTS >=9 compared to MTS<9).  We explored the 
Social Skills subscale in more detail, given previous research, but small effect sizes were 
observed at all cut-offs  (maximal at a cut-off of MTS>=7, with Cohen’s d=-0.41). 
For the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), none of the subscales correlated 
significantly with the MTS score although trends were found for both Fantasizing (r=.192, 
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p=.082) and Empathic Concern (r=.199, p=.073).  The correlations for Perspective Taking 
and Personal Distress were r=.093 and r=.034 respectively (both p>.10).   
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
For the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ), cluster analysis was used on this multi-
dimensional dataset to identify, in a data-driven way, different kinds of vicarious pain 
experience.  Previous research identified three groups (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017) 
consisting of people who report no overt pain experience (non-responders, who form the 
majority) and two smaller groups who report moderate-to-high levels of pain (‘responders’).  
Responders consist of those who tend to localize pain experience and use sensory 
descriptors (Sensory/Localised responders) and those who report a generalized feeling of 
pain and tend to use affective descriptors (Affective/General responders).  In our sample of 
people who took both the MTS screener and the VPQ, we identified 47 non-responders, 32 
Sensory/Localised responders, and 13 Affective/General responders. Figure 8 shows the 
relationship between MTS score and the proportion of people falling in each vicarious pain 
group.  Even relatively low levels of MTS (scores of 4-6) are associated with a strong 
tendency to report Sensory/Localised vicarious pain.  This association was analysed 
statistically by grouping MTS<7 and MTS>=7, revealing a shift from non-responders in the 
lower end to Sensory/Localised at the high end (χ2(1)=17.742, p<.001).  Affective/General 
responders were excluded from the analysis because they were rarer and, hence, violated 
the assumptions for chi-square expected cell counts.  The association between MTS and 
Sensory/Localised vicarious pain is expected given that MTS, by definition, requires a 
localized response that has a sensory quality.  Consistent with Study 1, it suggests that MTS 
should be understood in terms of somatosensation more broadly rather than touch 
specifically. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
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For the visuo-tactile interference task, one participant was excluded as an outlier (> 2 
S.D. on response times).  The mean response times and error rates are shown in Figure 9.  
Correlating the variables with MTS scores revealed a significant positive relationship 
between MTS score and number of errors on ‘no touch’ trials (r=.39, p=.047) together with a 
non-significant trend for response time on ‘no touch trials’ (r=.30, p=.079).  Thus, people with 
higher MTS scores have more difficulty in reporting ‘no touch’ to one’s own body whilst 
viewing touch to another body, consistent with the phenomenology of MTS.  All other p’s>.10.  
Considering these two measures in more detail, a cut-off of MTS>=4 yields a medium effect 
size for no-touch error (Cohen’s d=.789) and a large effect for no-touch RT (Cohen’s d=.923).  
Thus, despite limited power (a smaller sample was used in comparison to our other online 
measures as this required a lab visit for testing) we demonstrate that this test is sensitive to 
moderate levels of mirror-touch. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
General Discussion 
 
 The aim of this research was to establish how mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) is 
related to empathy and, hence, if it can be used a research tool to inform models in this area.  
In some accounts simulation is irrelevant to empathy because all the necessary information 
can be extracted visually: you don’t need to share someone’s touch/pain in order to 
understand that they are being touched or hurt (Hickok, 2014).  Alternatively, simulation 
might be important but there could be no added benefit of physically feeling the sensations 
of others as opposed to implicitly simulating them (i.e. MTS as a conscious experience is 
epiphenomenal).  Our research argues against the positions that simulation is irrelevant to 
empathy, or that consciously reported simulations are epiphenomenal.  We show that people 
with MTS are better at recognizing facial expressions of emotion, and report high levels of 
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emotional reactivity on the Empathy Quotient.  Of equal importance, they do not report 
greater cognitive empathy which is linked to higher-order understanding of mental states 
(theory-of-mind).  This suggests that their empathy differences are based on emotional 
responsivity to others rather than social understanding/mentalizing.   
 We demonstrate, for the first time, that MTS is also linked to the vicarious experience 
of pain.  This tends to also be accompanied by experiences of touch (Study 1) and other 
sensory qualities of pain (Study 2) and, in this regard, it differs qualitatively from the kinds of 
vicarious experiences reported by people without MTS.  Similarly, whereas watching 
someone scratching himself or herself tends to elicit feelings of itchiness in people without 
MTS it can elicit feelings of being touched or scratched in people with MTS.  This suggests 
that people with MTS are not an exaggerated version of normality but, instead represent a 
qualitative shift towards the use of body-specific representations to map between self and 
other (as opposed to relying on shared affective or feeling states alone).  People with MTS 
show greater differentiation between touch to humans and touch to inanimate stimuli 
(including dummies) which suggests that the mechanism is sensitive to the social nature of 
the stimulus and is not driven solely by visual properties (a dummy and a human are visually 
similar, but a dummy and a fan share the characteristic of being inanimate).  We have 
previously described MTS as a difficulty in computing body ownership (Banissy et al., 2009) 
– a specific form of the Self-Other Theory – and the current evidence from Study 1 is 
consistent with that. 
 One important theoretical debate concerns whether people with MTS are an 
exaggerated version of the norm (a kind of hyper-empathy) or should be construed instead 
as some qualitative variation of the norm (a different style of empathy).  On balance, we 
believe that the evidence presented here, notably from Study 1, is more consistent with the 
latter and – hence – that MTS reflects a categorical difference.  Participants who report very 
strong levels MTS or virtually no MTS have a qualitatively different pattern.  People with 
intermediate scores are harder to classify, which we attribute to measurement error, but we 
suggest for practical purposes that a split at <7 and >=7 on this measure captures the main 
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group differences.  Although the data from Study 2 was less informative in this regard, there 
was evidence against MTS being a form of hyper-empathy.  Considering performance on the 
Empathy Quotient, EQ (see again Figure 7): although we only found significant results only 
for emotional reactivity (between participants) it is noteworthy that (within participants) those 
people with little or no evidence of MTS (scores 0-3) showed a balanced pattern across 
subscales, those with probable MTS (scores >=7) show an imbalanced profile in which 
emotional reactivity exceeds self-reported social and mentalizing abilities (also see 
Santiesteban et al., 2015 for evidence of no difference in theory of mind abilities between 
verified mirror-touch synaesthetes and typical adult controls on objective tasks). How this 
imbalance impacts on broader social behaviour remains equivocal. For instance to 
experience appropriate levels of empathy requires enhancing representations of other 
people and inhibiting the representation of one’s own affective state (i.e. emotional reactivity); 
however in order to prevent excessive personal distress from another’s negative affective 
state, it can be adaptive to inhibit the representation of the other’s affective state and 
enhance the representations of the self. In this sense, an imbalanced profile in which 
emotional reactivity dominates, could in principle lead to positive or negative outcomes for 
social behaviour depending on the social context and/or variation in the coping strategies 
employed by an individual. This is consistent with interviews of people with MTS in which 
they don’t necessarily find their experiences to be helpful socially beyond the level of being 
able to identify (and identify with) the feelings of others (Martin, Cleghorn, & Ward, 2017).  
  The present study also helps to resolve some of the discrepancies in the literature.  
We show that the ability to detect differences related to MTS depends strongly on how liberal 
or conservative the cut-off measure is.  In particular, we suggest that the diagnostic cut-off 
used in the recent study of Baron-Cohen et al. (2016) was too low to detect differences in 
facial expression recognition or emotional reactivity.  This study also reported other 
potentially hard-to-explain observations with regards to mirror-touch: namely, a tendency to 
report touch when objects are touched, worse self-reported social skills (that we already 
discussed), and a possible link with autism.  With regards to touch to objects, the results of 
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Study 1 and our previous research (Holle et al., 2011) are in agreement with Baron-Cohen et 
al.’s (2016) findings that people with MTS report tactile experiences when objects are 
touched (albeit lower in intensity/frequency).  However, we have put forward new evidence 
that this mainly reflects a simulation of the act of touching (felt on the fingertip) rather than 
‘empathy for objects’.  This would also explain why the original visuo-tactile interference task 
of Banissy and Ward (2007) showed no evidence of heightened interference in MTS when 
tactile stimulation was delivered to the face when watching objects (e.g. a fan) touched with 
a hand.  We now make the novel prediction that we would expect to see the effect with 
observed touch to objects if the tactile stimulus were applied to the finger instead.  With 
regards to a possible link to autistic traits, we remain agnostic on this point.  Synaesthesia in 
general has been shown to be linked to increased autistic tendencies (Ward et al., 2017).  
However, this was shown to affect some autistic traits (e.g. attention-to-detail, sensory 
sensitivity) more than others (e.g. in the social realm).  We also note that autism may be 
linked to impairments in some aspects of empathy more than others.  Whilst mentalizing (or 
cognitive empathy) is consistently low (Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998), the 
evidence relating to vicarious experiences is more inconsistent with some evidence 
suggesting it may be heightened (e.g. Fan, Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng, 2014) or normal 
(e.g. Bird et al., 2010). Recent accounts highlight the role of altered self-other control in 
autism (e.g. Sowden et al., 2016; Bird & Viding, 2014) and MTS (Santiesteban et al., 2015; 
Ward & Banissy, 2015).  In particular a reduced tendency to be able to engage in imitation-
inhibition has been found in both groups. With this in mind, one might expect some degree 
of relationship between some autistic tendencies and MTS. 
Finally, another important aim was to produce a screening measure that is easy to 
administer (including online) and will result in a more standardized approach in the literature, 
as has happened for other forms of synaesthesia (Eagleman, Kagan, Nelson, Sagaram, & 
Sarma, 2007).  We believe that our screening tool will serve this purpose.  It can easily be 
administered online and is freely available to the field.  It does not result in unrealistically 
high levels of self-report of MTS, and high scorers on this measure follow the profile of 
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people with MTS who have passed lab-based measures of mirror-touch (e.g. Banissy & 
Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009).  Importantly, we assessed phenomenology without 
strongly guiding participants to one ‘desired’ answer: participants were free to choose from a 
range of answers (including tingling, pain without touch) although for our purposes we only 
defined the score based only on tactile experiences.  Based on our findings we recommend 
a cut-off no lower than MTS>=7 (i.e. 50% or more of trials eliciting a tactile response).  
Although there is some evidence of medium-sized effects emerging below this level (e.g. 
facial expression task, visuo-tactile interference task), most effects become strongest at 
MTS>=9 on this measure.  For controls, one could either select the complementary sample 
(MTS <7) or focus solely on those with very low scores (0-2), excluding those with 
intermediate scores.   
 In summary, we have developed a new screening measure for MTS. We show that 
MTS is related to vicarious experiences more generally (including to itch and pain) but is not 
a simple exaggerated version of normality.  MTS is related to increased emotional reactivity 
to others and better ability to read facial expressions of emotion, and routinely uses body-
specific (somatotopic) representations to map states between self and other.   
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Figure	Captions	
Figure	1.	 	The	presence	of	MTS	is	assessed	by	measuring	the	number	of	tactile	responses	(ignoring	
non-tactile	responses)	to	14	videos	depicting	touch	to	a	human.		Top:	The	distribution	of	scores	from	
N=283	 undergraduates	 naïve	 as	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 study.	 	 Bottom:	 The	 prevalence	 of	 MTS,	
estimated	from	the	same	sample,	depending	on	the	number	of	affirmative	answers	given	(i.e.	1	or	
more,	2	or	more,	etc.).	
Figure	 2.	 	 Average	 intensity	 ratings	 (0-10	 scale)	 for	 all	 vicarious	 experiences	 as	 a	 function	 of	MTS	
score.	 	Top:	ratings	for	stimuli	depicting	touch	to	a	human,	dummy,	or	object.	 	Bottom:	ratings	for	
stimuli	depicting	pain	or	itch.			
Figure	3.	 	 The	qualitative	 characteristics	 of	 vicarious	 experience	 as	 a	 function	of	MTS	 score.	 	 Top:	
When	observing	touch	to	an	object	(a	fan)	by	a	hand/finger,	people	with	high	scores	tend	to	report	
localized	experiences	on	their	own	hand/finger	rather	than	face	or	torso.		Bottom:	When	observing	
someone	 scratching	 themselves,	people	with	high	 scores	 tend	 to	 report	 tactile	experiences	 rather	
feelings	of	itchiness	or	tingling.	
Figure	4.	 	The	qualitative	experiences	of	vicarious	pain	as	a	 function	of	MTS	score.	 	The	top	 figure	
shows	 the	 qualitative	 distribution	 of	 responses	 (i.e.	 excluding	 trials	 in	 which	 no	 experience	 was	
reported).		The	bottom	figure	shows	the	quantitative	distribution	of	responses	as	a	function	of	MTS	
score.			
Figure	5.		The	spatial	reference	frame	used	to	map	observed	and	synaesthetic	touch	in	people	who	
report	2	or	more	tactile	experiences.		Specular	denotes	a	mirrored	relationship	(reflection	symmetry)	
and	 anatomical	 denotes	 a	 mapping	 within	 body-centered	 space	 (rotational	 symmetry).	 	 An	
inconsistent	mapping	occurs	if	there	are	equal	numbers	of	each	or	if	they	differ	by	one.			
Figure	6.		Performance	on	the	Cambridge	Face	Perception	Test	for	emotional	expressions	and	facial	
identity.		The	effect	size	(Cohen’s	d)	for	facial	expressions	is	plotted	in	more	detail	for	different	cut-
offs	for	diagnosing	MTS.			
Figure	7.		Performance	on	the	Empathy	Quotient	(EQ)	and	Inter-personal	Reactivity	Index	(IRI).		The	
effect	size	(Cohen’s	d)	for	emotional	reactivity	and	social	skills	is	plotted	in	more	detail	for	different	
cut-offs	for	diagnosing	MTS.			
Figure	8.	 	Performance	on	the	Vicarious	Pain	Questionnaire	(VPQ)	as	a	function	of	MTS	score.	 	The	
Sensory/Localised	 group	 report	 localized	 pain	 using	 sensory	 descriptors	when	 observing	 others	 in	
pain.	 	 The	 Affective/General	 group	 report	 general,	 non-localised	 pain	 using	 affective	 descriptors	
when	observing	others	 in	pain.	 	Non-responders	 report	 little	or	no	pain	when	observing	others	 in	
pain.			
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Figure	9.	 	Performance	on	the	visuo-tactile	 interference	task	 in	which	participants	must	report	the	
location	of	touch	on	their	own	face	(left,	right,	both,	none)	when	observing	touch	to	someone	elses	
face	(left,	right,	both).		Trials	involving	physical	touch	are	categorized	as	either	spatially	congruent	or	
incongruent	and	no-touch	trials	are	considered	separately.  
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